Nanotechnology: Using Co-Regulation to Bring Regulation of Modern Technologies into the 21st Century by Reese, Michelle
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 23 | Issue 2
2013
Nanotechnology: Using Co-Regulation to Bring
Regulation of Modern Technologies into the 21st
Century
Michelle Reese
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Michelle Reese, Nanotechnology: Using Co-Regulation to Bring Regulation of Modern Technologies into the 21st Century, 23 Health Matrix
537 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol23/iss2/20
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013 
537 
Nanotechnology: Using  
Co-regulation to Bring Regulation 
of Modern Technologies into the 21st 
Century 
Michelle Reese† 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................... 538 
I. What is Nanotechnology? .......................................................... 541 
A.  The Unsuspecting Consumer of Nanomaterials .................................. 542 
B.  Nanotoxicology: The Toxic Effects of Nanotechnology ....................... 543 
C.  Studies Reporting the Specific Dangers of Nanotechnology ................ 545 
D.  The Benefits of Nanotechnology ......................................................... 548 
II. Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology ............ 549 
A.  The Toxic Substances Control Act ..................................................... 550 
1.  The TSCA Process ....................................................................... 551 
2.  Limitations on TSCA Authority .................................................. 552 
B.  A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Applying TSCA to 
Nanotechnology ................................................................................. 553 
1.  Classification Confusion and Proposed Alternatives ..................... 554 
2.  Lack of Risk Assessment and Uncertainty of Risks ...................... 556 
3.  Applying the Least-Burdensome Regulations ............................... 557 
III. Regulating Nanotechnology .................................................... 558 
A.  Self-Regulation ................................................................................... 559 
B.  Federal Agency Regulation ................................................................. 560 
C.  Co-Regulation ..................................................................................... 562 
1.  Step One: Creating Nanotech Divisions ....................................... 565 
2.  Step Two: Manufacturer Information Production ........................ 566 
3.  Step Three: Quantitative Risk Assessments ................................. 567 
4.  Step Four: Developing Guidance and Regulations ....................... 569 
5.  Step Five: Adjusting Nanotech Divisions to Address Actual 
Risks ........................................................................................... 570 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 572 
 
†  J.D., 2013, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to 
thank Louis L. McMahon for introducing me to nanotechnology and for his 
insight into the topic. I would also like to thank Professor Sharona 
Hoffman and Professor Catherine LaCroix for their editorial support and 
guidance throughout the Note-writing process. Finally, I would like to 
thank my family—Michael, Tristan, Ava, Steve, Kathy and Stephanie—for 
their continued support and patience during my time as a law student and 
while writing this Note. 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013  
Nanotechnology 
538 
Introduction 
With the emergence of many cutting-edge technologies, we are often 
promised radical and unsubstantiated benefits. These benefits may include 
anything from sunscreens with smoother application to innovative 
methods for delivering medications throughout the body.1 With 
nanotechnology, a wide range of common products have been improved 
in function, cost effectiveness, or both.2 Nanotechnology is currently used 
in products Americans use daily: food, appliances, sunscreen, medication, 
clothing, and cosmetics. This present application of nanotechnology to 
enhance our everyday lives shows just how much promise nanotechnology 
holds for the future. 
Nevertheless, nanotechnology may also present new risks. Scientists 
are not sure whether nanotechnology poses any serious health hazards to 
humans or the environment. Considering our wide exposure to nano-
technology, it is critical that we identify potential risks and impose 
regulations that strike a balance between accessing the benefits of 
nanotechnology and limiting the foreseeable harm to the environment 
and public health.  
Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter on an atomic scale to 
create tiny, functional structures.3 These structures are incredibly small: 
one nanometer is precisely one-billionth of a meter.4 Nanotechnology is 
defined as the production of materials that are between one and one-
hundred nanometers in size.5 Although they cannot be seen with the 
naked eye, these microscopic structures called “nanoparticles” have been 
proven to benefit humans in a variety of ways. For example, they can 
lead to new medical treatments.6 They also can be used to develop 
 
1. Some Examples of How Nanotechnology Impacts Our Lives Now, 
NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, http://www.nanotech-now.com/current-uses.htm 
(last updated May 22, 2012, 9:56 PM); Researchers Create DNA Buckyballs 
for Drug Delivery, PHYSORG (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.physorg.com/ 
news6066.html 
2. NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1. 
3. Extramural Research: Nanotechnology, EPA, http://epa.gov/ncer/nano/ 
questions/index.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2011). 
4. David Bradley, Measuring Up Size Comparisons, SCIENCEBASE (June 7, 
2007, 4:00 PM), http://www.sciencebase.com/science-blog/measuring-up-
size-comparisons.html. 
5. MARK RATNER & DANIEL RATNER, NANOTECHNOLOGY: A GENTLE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BIG IDEA 7 (Michelle Vincenti ed., 2003); see 
A. Elder et al., Human Health Risks of Engineered Nanomaterials, in 
NANOMATERIALS: RISKS AND BENEFITS 3, 5 (Igor Linkov & Jeffery Steevens 
eds., 2009). 
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bahm, Fullerene Finding Shows Possibilities and Dangers 
of Nanotechnology (Apr. 8, 2010), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/ 
chicago/news.aspx?id=162744. 
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building materials with a very high strength-to-weight ratio.7 Sunscreen 
and cosmetics that make use of nanoparticles apply more smoothly and 
evenly to human skin.8 Other examples of products that utilize  
nanoparticles include stain-resistant clothing, lightweight golf clubs, 
bicycles, car bumpers, antimicrobial wound dressings, and synthetic 
bones.9 
While there are many benefits presented by nanotechnology, there 
are also potential risks. Studies have indicated that nanoparticles called 
carbon nanotubes act like asbestos within the human body.10 Cells that 
are exposed to nanostructures called “buckyballs”11 have been shown to 
undergo slowed or even halted cell division.12 In general, the small size 
and high surface-area-to-volume ratio of nanoparticles indicates a higher 
potential for toxicity.13 
The application of nanotechnology to drug development has aided 
the treatment of common life-threatening diseases while concurrently 
posing toxic side effects.14 For example, carbon nanotubes15 may be used 
to enhance cancer treatments, but there is also an indication that the 
nanotubes themselves might ironically have a carcinogenic effect on the 
human body.16 Certain nanoparticles can be used to enhance water 
filtration systems, but there are concerns that the production of  
nanoscale products may lead to new types of water pollution.17 Common 
 
7. Min-Feng Yu et al., Strength and Breaking Mechanism of Multiwalled 
Carbon Nanotubes Under Tensile Load, 287 SCIENCE 637, 637 (2000). 
8. NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1. 
9. Id.; Vivian S.W. Chan, Nanomedicine: An Unresolved Regulatory Issue, 46 
REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 218, 220 (2006). 
10. See infra Part I.C. 
11. See infra Part I.C. 
12. See infra Part I.C. 
13. GEORGIA MILLER, NANOMATERIALS, SUNSCREENS AND COSMETICS: SMALL 
INGREDIENTS BIG RISKS 6 (May 2006), available at http://nano.foe.org.au/ 
sites/default/files/FoEA%20nano%20cosmetics%20report%202MB.pdf. 
(“There is a general relationship between particle size and toxicity; the 
smaller a particle, the greater its surface area to volume ratio, and the 
more likely it is to prove toxic.”). 
14. Nanotubes and their Applications, UNDERSTANDINGNANO.COM, 
http://www.understandingnano.com/nanotubes-carbon.html (last visited 
May 12, 2013). 
15. Carbon nanotubes are a tube-like nanoscale structure made from carbon 
that are very strong and very lightweight and have been found to have 
many uses, from medical treatments to enhancing building materials. See 
id. 
16. See infra Part I.C. 
17. David Grimshaw, Nanotechnology for Clean Water: Facts and Figures, 
SCIDEV.NET (May 6, 2009), http://www.scidev.net/en/agriculture-and-
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to these examples is the difficulty in determining whether the benefits of 
nanotechnology will outweigh the risks.  
One place to turn for answers is the regulatory agency tasked with 
investigating the risks posed by nanotechnology. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has the regulatory authority to assess the 
environmental and public health risks associated with nanotechnology, 
and to prescribe regulations as needed to prevent or reduce those risks.18 
Unfortunately, authority to assess those risks does not mean the EPA 
has adequate tools to do so.19 Nanotechnology is becoming ubiquitous as 
the industry continues to expand, and new products are being created 
every day.20 The need for thorough risk assessment, followed by  
appropriate risk management, is becoming more important as potential 
environmental and public exposure to nanoparticles is becoming more 
common.21  
Nanotechnology is not categorically dangerous.22 The current danger 
is that it is unknown whether nanoparticles present any risks to the 
environment and public health. As more common household products are 
created or enhanced with nanoparticles, public exposure to nanotechnology 
is increasing rapidly.23 This increasing public exposure indicates an urgent 
need for risk assessment. And as exposure increases, it becomes more 
important that the EPA be able to determine what risks will accompany 
that exposure, if any, so that it can properly balance the risks against 
the benefits and promulgate the most effective rules. 
Generally speaking, the EPA is familiar with assessing risks and  
regulating new products. The EPA has authority through the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA) to regulate chemical manufacturing.24 
TSCA requires manufacturers to inform the EPA of the potential risks 
associated with a new product, or new uses for an existing product, 
before production begins.25 This gives the EPA an opportunity to 
prohibit or limit the manufacturing of that substance.26 While this seems 
 
environment/land-water-pollution/features/nanotechnology-for-clean-
water-facts-and-figures.html. 
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2011). 
19. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, EPA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: OVERSIGHT FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 24 (2007), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/ 
assets/files/2698/197_nanoepa_pen9.pdf [hereinafter DAVIES 1]. 
20. See id. at 13. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 13–14. 
23. Id. 
24. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2011). 
25. Id. § 2601(b)(1). 
26. Id. § 2601(b)(2). 
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to suggest that the EPA is well-equipped to manage the potential risks 
of products containing nanoparticles, some say that TSCA is outdated 
and that it will be difficult to use this older statute to regulate modern 
technology.27  
Part I of this Note provides background on nanotechnology, including 
what it is, how it can be useful, and risks it may present. Part II discusses 
the potential use of TSCA to assess the risks associated with new 
technologies and the challenges that may arise in trying to apply TSCA 
to nanotechnology.28 Part III proposes alternatives to using current EPA 
regulations to regulate nanotechnology. These alternatives include self-
regulation, agency regulation through a newly proposed agency, and a 
way to combine the benefits of these proposals while eliminating the 
weaknesses through the use of co-regulation and the creation of a 
Nanotech Division within each key agency associated with nanotechnology. 
I. What is Nanotechnology? 
Nanotechnology is the creation of functional structures with at least 
one dimension that measures between one and one hundred nanometers.29 
To illustrate how small this is, a human hair is approximately 100,000 
nanometers wide.30 Comparing a nanometer to a meter is equivalent to 
comparing the size of a marble to the size of the Earth.31 When an 
element or molecule is manufactured on the nanoscale, it may have 
different physical and chemical properties than those found in the same 
element or molecule manufactured on a large scale.32 If a one-inch cube 
of gold is cut into four equal pieces, each of those pieces will retain the 
physical and chemical properties of the original cube of gold—including 
melting point, boiling point, color, etc. This will remain true as you 
continue cutting the gold into smaller and smaller pieces, even when the 
pieces are too small to be seen with the naked eye. But once those pieces 
 
27. See J. CLARENCE DAVIES, OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 23-24 (2009), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/ 
process/assets/files/7316/pen-18.pdf [hereinafter DAVIES 2]. 
28. It is important to keep in mind that while the EPA is involved with a wide 
range of environmental concerns, from product development to waste 
disposal, the scope of this Note is focused on regulating nanotechnology at 
the earliest stages of development, production, manufacturing and 
marketing to consumers. 
29. Andre Nel et al., Toxic Potential of Materials at the Nanolevel, 311 
SCIENCE 622, 622 (2006). 
30. How Big is a Nanometer?!, NANOSCIENCE KITS (Jan. 20, 2010, 2:02 PM), 
http://www.nanosciencekits.org/how-big-is-a-nanometer. 
31. Christopher J. Chetsanga, Professor, Univ. of Zimbabwe, Presentation at 
Breakout Session on Nanotechnology in Health Sciences (Nov. 4–6, 2009) 
(on file with author). 
32. See RATNER & RATNER, supra note 5, at 12. 
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are so small that they enter the nanoscale, those physical and chemical 
properties may change.33  
The manufacture of nanoscale materials, or nanofabrication, can  
occur in one of two ways. Top-down nanofabrication is when a large 
item is cut down to the nanoscale.34 Bottom-up nanofabrication is when 
individual atoms are assembled to create a nanostructure.35 Both types 
of nanofabrication produce nanoparticles exhibiting new chemical or 
physical properties or both. This can lead to a variety of new products 
and enhancement of existing products. One element in particular, 
carbon, has been found to be very useful on the nanoscale. Carbon 
nanotubes are known for being extremely lightweight and extremely 
strong, having the highest tensile strength36 of any material tested.37  
A. The Unsuspecting Consumer of Nanomaterials 
Most consumers are unaware or unconcerned that many common 
products they use contain nanoscale materials, including food, sunscreen, 
hair straighteners, clothing, computer hardware, bicycles, wound 
dressings, air sanitizing spray, health supplements, bricks, toothpaste, 
baby products, and automotive lubricants.38 Non-profit consumer safety 
groups have voiced concerns regarding consumers being unknowingly 
exposed to nanomaterials through the application of sunscreen or the 
foods they eat.39 While these non-profit consumer safety groups have 
begun to take action, surveys have shown that the public may not be 
concerned with the risks associated with nanotechnology.40 A 2011 
survey showed that consumers ranked the risks associated with 
nanotechnology fairly low when compared to other health risks.41  
 
33. Id.  
34. Id.  
35. Id.  
36. Tensile strength is the “force required to pull something such as rope, wire, 
or a structural beam to the point where it breaks.” Science Reference: 
Tensile Strength, SCIENCE DAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/ 
t/tensile_strength.htm (last visited May 11, 2013). 
37. Yu et al., supra note 7, at 637. 
38. All Products, PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES 
http://www.nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/browse/products/ 
(last visited May 11, 2013) (providing a list of consumer products 
containing nanoscale materials).  
39. Consumer Safety Groups File First Lawsuit on Risks of Nanotechnology, 
NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, http://www.nanotech-now.com/news.cgi? story_id 
=44147 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
40. John Timmer, US Public Fears a Bad Sunburn More than Nanotech, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 15, 2011, 12:39 PM), http://arstechnica.com/science/ 
2011/04/us-public-fears-a-bad-sunburn-more-than-nanotech. 
41. Id.  
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While it is understandable that consumers expect commonly used 
products to be safe for everyday use, the demand for complete safety 
may be unreasonable. There are many common products that do not 
utilize nanotechnology that will never be completely risk-free, including 
cars, over-the-counter pain medications, and steak knives. There are 
risks involved in the use of these products, but the benefits of proper use 
outweigh those risks. The same may be true for nanotechnology. 
Some nanotechnology products are less common or do not involve 
regular consumer exposure. For example, nanomedicine is a quickly 
growing field of study.42 Nanomedicine is the use of nanotechnology for 
medical purposes, including the enhancement of pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices.43 Studies have suggested that nanotechnology could play 
an important role in treating cancer.44 There is no doubt that many 
people would be in favor of technological advances that have the 
potential to save lives or enhance quality of life. There may be less 
concern over the potential risks of nanotechnology when those who are 
in need of medical treatments are informed of the benefits. 
B. Nanotoxicology: The Toxic Effects of Nanotechnology 
Nanotoxicology is an emerging area of study that explores the effects of 
nanoparticles within the body.45 Nanoparticles can enter the human body 
through several types of exposure, including ingestion, inhalation, injection, 
and skin absorption.46 Exposure to nanotechnology occurs even without 
technological advances because nanoparticles exist naturally in the  
environment.47 While humans have always been exposed to nanoparticles, 
 
42. See What is Nanomedicine, NANOMEDICINE CENTER, 
http://www.nanomedicinecenter.com/what-is-nanomedicine (last visited 
May 11, 2013). 
43. Id.  
44. Researchers Effectively Treat Tumors with Use of Nanotubes, WAKE 
FOREST BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER, http://www.wakehealth.edu/News-
Releases/2009/Researchers_Effectively_Treat_Tumors_with_Use_of_ 
Nanotubes.htm (last updated Aug. 13, 2009) [hereinafter WAKE FOREST]; 
Researchers Use Nanotubes to Treat Tumors, RADIOLOGY TODAY, 
http://www.radiologytoday.net/news/082509_news.shtml (last visited May 
16, 2013). 
45. See Günter Oberdörster et al., Nanotoxicology: An Emerging Discipline 
Evolving from Studies of Ultrafine Particles, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
823, 823 (2005); The Dose Makes the Poison, 6 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 
329, 329 (2011). Nanotoxicology involves researching the ways that 
nanoscale particles can react differently within the body than particles of 
the same material in a larger size. The toxicity of nanomaterials can be 
“unexpected and unusual” and the interactions between nanoparticles can 
be dynamic, making it very challenging to determine how nanoparticles 
will react within the human body. Id. 
46. Oberdörster, supra note 45, at 823. 
47. Id.  
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nanotoxicology is important now because human exposure has “increased 
dramatically” due to the use of nanotechnology in a variety of  
products.48 This has made it essential that researchers go beyond simply 
studying the toxicology of nanoparticles within the body in general and 
begin studying the toxicology of larger quantities of nanoparticles within 
the body. 
Research has shown that large-scale materials that are harmless can 
become more toxic when they are manufactured down to the nanoscale.49 
With relatively little knowledge of how nanoparticles will react within 
the human body, it is difficult to determine when risks are posed to 
human health or how severe those risks may be.50 As discussed below, 
some studies have indicated that nanostructures called carbon nanotubes 
may act similarly to asbestos within the body, which could lead to life-
threatening diseases like cancer.51 Due to our current knowledge of 
asbestos toxicology, some scientists have chosen to focus on the toxicity 
of long-term exposure to nanoparticles compared to the toxicity of short-
term exposure.52 To date, there have not been any reports of deaths from 
short-term exposure to nanoparticles, but the story of asbestos began the 
same way. It was only after long-term exposure that people started 
getting sick and dying from asbestosis.53  
One general concern is that nanoparticles tend to aggregate within 
the body, creating an increased volume of nanoparticles with each 
additional exposure.54 There also appears to be a “natural passageway” 
for nanoparticles to delve into and around the body through the  
membranes that separate bodily organs.55 This natural passageway gives 
nanoparticles a high level of mobility within the body.56 Increased 
mobility of nanoparticles within the body means that inhaled particles 
will not be restricted to the lungs; similarly, ingested particles will not 
be restricted to the gastrointestinal tract.57 While this should not be 
 
48. Id.  
49. Chan, supra note 9, at 220. 
50. See id. at 221.  
51. See infra Part I.C; Atsuya Takagi et al., Induction of Mesothelioma in 
P53+/- Mouse by Intraperitoneal Application of Multi-walled Carbon 
Nanotube, 33 J. TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 105, 105–06 (2008).  
52. Chan, supra note 9, at 221.  
53. Id.; Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last updated 
May 1, 2009). 
54. Chan, supra note 9, at 221. 
55. Id. 
56. Id.  
57. See Wim H. De Jong & Paul J.A. Borm, Drug Delivery and Nanoparticles: 
Applications and Hazards, 3 INT. J. NANOMEDICINE 133, 133 (2008); Chan, 
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medically alarming in and of itself, it does hint at the potential for any 
harm from nanoparticles to be widespread throughout the body.  
Other concerns arise from findings that show that certain nanoparti-
cles may be transmitted to a fetus through the mother’s placenta, 
although it is unknown whether this could have a negative impact on fetal 
development or the future health of the child.58 If exposure to  
nanoparticles is ever confirmed to cause health risks in general, those risks 
would be magnified by the fact that any pregnant woman exposed to 
nanoparticles will be exposing her fetus as well. This could include 
exposure that occurs during the pregnancy and exposure that occurred 
before the pregnancy began, because nanoparticles can accumulate and 
remain within the body long after exposure.59 
C. Studies Reporting the Specific Dangers of Nanotechnology 
According to some commentators, the uncertainty of risks posed by 
nanotechnology is particularly worrisome. While the actual risks of 
nanotechnology may remain unknown, the many routes through which 
nanoparticles may enter the body60 suggest that simply being near 
nanoparticles puts people at risk of having nanoparticles enter their 
body. This can vary based on the type of product to which one is being 
exposed. For example, rubbing sunscreen on your skin will more likely 
lead to absorption than simply touching a bicycle because sunscreen is 
designed to be absorbed into the skin. Nanoparticles being injected as 
medication or consumed as food will have a direct entrance into the 
body. Because nanoparticles have many routes of exposure, scientists 
must determine what effects those nanoparticles will have once inside 
 
supra note 9, at 221. The ability of nanoparticles to travel easily through 
barriers between organs introduces both a risk and a benefit. There may be 
instances where nanoparticles can cause harm by being able to travel freely 
throughout the body, but there may also be times when the ability of 
nanoparticles to travel through organ barriers is a useful for drug delivery. 
Id. 
58. Chan, supra note 9, at 221; Jeffrey A. Keelan, Nanoparticles Versus the 
Placenta, 6 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 263, 263 (2011) (noting that 
damage to the placenta and fetus were caused by exposing mice to smaller 
nanoparticles, while mice exposed to larger nanoparticles showed no signs 
of damage to fetus or placenta); see generally Peter Wick et al., Barrier 
Capacity of Human Placenta for Nanosized Materials, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSPS. 432 (2010) (detailing a study that showed testing on human 
placentas showed nanoparticles were able to cross the placental barrier). 
59. Y. Song et al., Exposure to Nanoparticles is Related to Pleural Effusion, 
Pulmonary Fibrosis and Granuloma, 34 EUR. RESPIRATORY J. 559, 559 
(2009); see Poison, supra note 45, at 329. 
60. See Oberdörster et al., supra note 45, at 823. 
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the body. Several studies on the effects of nanoparticles in the body have 
been conducted, and the results have been mixed.61 
One study, known as the Takagi study, suggests that carbon nano-
tubes present serious enough risks to be labeled “the next asbestos.”62 
This label should not be taken lightly, as the long-term health effects of 
asbestos became a major concern after years of acute asbestos exposure 
led to mesothelioma in a large number of people.63 In the Takagi study, 
mice exhibited symptoms similar to mesothelioma after being injected 
with multi-walled carbon nanotubes (MWCNTs).64 The Takagi study 
was later “criticized for the use of extremely high doses” of MWCNTs;65 
another researcher indicated that the doses were “highly unrealistic.”66  
A second study, known as the Poland study, was conducted to  
further investigate the “asbestos-like pathogenicity” of MWCNTs.67 The 
Poland study led to results similar to those in the Takagi study, including 
the formation of granulomas and inflammation in mice, and the research-
ers concluded that the size and shape of the injected MWCNTs was a 
factor that contributed to the negative health effects.68 While all 
MWCNTs are nanoparticles, their exact size and shape can vary.69  
61. See id.; Takagi et al., supra note 51; Craig A. Poland et al., Carbon 
Nanotubes Introduced into the Abdominal Cavity of Mice Show Asbestos-
Like Pathology in a Pilot Study, 3 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 423, 423 
(2008). 
62. See Takagi et al., supra note 51. 
63. Mesothelioma is a rare lung cancer that is caused by exposure to asbestos. 
Asbestos fibers can lodge into a protective membrane around the lungs 
called the mesothelial lining. Tumors can form where the asbestos fibers 
have lodged in the mesothelial lining. Researchers have hypothesized how 
this leads to cancer. One idea is that the asbestos fibers cause irritation to 
the lining, which can then lead to “irreversible scarring, cellular damage 
and cancer.” Another possibility is that the asbestos fibers interrupt 
cellular division, causing genetic changes that lead to cancer. A final theory 
is that the asbestos releases free radicals, which then damage the DNA and 
cause healthy cells to become cancerous. Mesothelioma Causes, 
MESOTHELIOMA CTR., http://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/causes.php 
(last modified Feb. 18, 2013). 
64. Takagi et al., supra note 51, at 105. MWCNTs are a type of nanoparticle 
that has been researched for use in medical devices, as well as for many 
unrelated uses, but have been shown to possibly have negative health 
effects similar to mesothelioma. See id. 
65. Gaku Ichihara et al., Letter to the Editor, 33 J. TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 381, 
381 (2008); Andrew D. Maynard et al., The New Toxicology of 
Sophisticated Materials: Nanotoxicology and Beyond, 120(S1) 
TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. S109, S116 (2010). 
66. Ichihara et al., supra note 65, at 381. 
67. Poland et al., supra note 61, at 423 
68. Id.  
69. Id.  
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Researchers found that the longer, thinner MWCNTs caused more 
granulomas and inflammation than the shorter, thicker ones.70 Although 
researchers are not entirely sure why exposure to asbestos particles 
causes lung cancer, most hypotheses indicate that it is the size and shape 
of the asbestos particles, not the chemical make-up, that leads to lung 
cancer after asbestos exposure.71 The Poland study has been criticized for 
falsely concluding that the health effects caused by MWCNTs injected 
into mice stomachs are an accurate representation of the health effects 
that humans would experience after inhaling MWCNTs.72  
In another study, done at Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Los 
Alamos study), researchers studied fullerenes, also known as “bucky-
balls,” which are cage-like nanostructures made of carbon and shaped 
like soccer balls.73 Researchers have suggested that buckyballs would 
make excellent drug delivery devices.74 In the Los Alamos study,  
researchers studied plain buckyballs, as well as two modified versions 
known as “tris” and “hexa.”75 While the plain and hexa buckyballs 
showed no damage to cells, the tris configuration had a toxic reaction 
within human tissue.76 The researchers noted that the presence of these 
buckyballs induced “cell cycle arrest and premature senescence in human 
skin cells.” 77 In other words, the cells stopped growing, dividing, and 
dying, as if their lifecycles simply ended.78 This study demonstrated  
 
70. Id.  
71. See MESOTHELIOMA CTR., supra note 63. 
72. John C. Monica, Jr. & John C. Monica, A Nano-Mesothelioma False 
Alarm, 5 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 319, 319 (2008). 
73. Jun Gao et al., Fullerene Derivatives Induce Premature Senescence: A 
New Toxicity Paradigm or Novel Biomedical Applications, 244 
TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 130, 130 (2010); Bahm, supra 
note 6. 
74. Bahm, supra note 6; Researchers Create DNA Buckyballs for Drug 
Delivery, PHYSORG (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www.physorg.com/ 
news6066.html; see Darshana Nagda et al., Bucky Balls: A Novel Drug 
Delivery System, 2 J. CHEMICAL & PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 240, 243-44 
(2010). 
75. Gao et al., supra note 73, at 131. “Tris” and “hexa” refer to the number of 
branches that come off of the buckyball structure. A “plain” buckyball has 
no branches, a tris buckyball has three branches, and a hexa buckyball has 
six branches. The various configurations can lead to different uses for the 
buckyballs, as well as different risks. Carbon Nanostructures, LOS ALAMOS 
NATIONAL LIBRARY, http://tri-lab.lanl.gov/index.php/scientific-discovery/ 
62-carbon-nanostructures (last visited May 12, 2013). 
76. Gao et al., supra note 73, at 131. 
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http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/03/100331151146.htm. 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013  
Nanotechnology 
548 
that a tiny change in nanostructures can be the “difference between  
treatment and toxicity.”79  
The three studies above highlight the importance of assessing the 
risks of nanotechnology and regulating those risks appropriately. If even 
small changes in the nanostructure can be the difference between 
something beneficial and something dangerous, regulators will want to 
ensure that research is conducted to clarify exactly what risks are 
present so they can regulate accordingly. There may also be a chance 
that a nanomaterial deemed safe could accidentally be manufactured 
incorrectly due to human error or another type of malfunction. For 
example, if a buckyball structure is determined to be safe for use as a 
drug delivery method, regulators should require that manufacturing of 
that product follow strict inspection and quality guidelines to ensure 
that only safe configurations of buckyballs are produced and marketed. 
D. The Benefits of Nanotechnology  
Nanotechnology serves a variety of useful purposes. In some instances, 
entirely new products have been created using nanotechnology. In other 
cases, nanotechnology has improved products that already exist by 
increasing their function, cost-effectiveness, or both.  
While there are a wide variety of uses for nanotechnology, carbon 
nanotubes in particular offer one of the most intriguing, and perhaps 
desired uses: enhanced cancer treatments. A collaborative research study 
by Wake Forest University School of Medicine, the Wake Forest 
University Center for Nanotechnology and Molecular Materials, Rice 
University, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
showed that when MWCNTs are inserted into tumors and then exposed 
to laser-generated near-infrared radiation there is a high rate of tumor 
elimination.80 
During the study, researchers injected MWCNTs into kidney tumors 
in mice. Some mice were injected with more MWCNTs than others, and 
some were not injected at all.81 Some were exposed to the radiation and 
some were not.82 Mice that received no treatment died within thirty days 
of the beginning of the study.83 Mice that were injected with the 
MWCNTs but not exposed to the radiation and mice that were exposed 
to the radiation but not injected with the MWCNTs also died within 
about thirty days.84 The mice that received the injections of MWCNTs 
followed by thirty seconds of exposure to the radiation lived much longer 
 
79. Bahm, supra note 6. 
80. See WAKE FOREST, supra note 44; RADIOLOGY TODAY, supra note 44. 
81. WAKE FOREST, supra note 44. 
82. Id. 
83. Id.  
84. Id.  
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than those that did not receive both treatments.85 The study also showed 
that the mice that were given higher quantities of MWCNTs lived longer 
than those that were given smaller quantities.86 This same study is now 
being conducted with breast cancer cells in hopes that the results will be 
similar.87 If nanotechnology can be used to enhance high-priority medical 
treatments such as those for cancer, then advancement of that technology 
is likely to be very desirable.  
Nanotechnology offers benefits for the industrial and energy sectors. 
Nanoscale coatings can be used for weatherproofing, increasing durability, 
and cleaning.88 Nanotechnology can be used to enhance operations of our 
current energy sources or to help the United States transition to “cleaner” 
sources of energy.89 Nanoscale substances can be used to create coatings 
that prevent corrosion and withstand high heat, enhancing the durability 
of the infrastructure of nuclear power plants.90 Nanotechnology can also 
be used in the production of photovoltaic cells used to harness solar 
power and to improve turbines used to harness wind energy.91 In 
addition to these large-scale benefits, nanotechnology can also be used to 
enhance smaller-scale products like sunscreen and cosmetics in similar 
ways.92 
II. Balancing the Risks and Benefits  
of Nanotechnology 
As discussed above, while there are many potentially beneficial uses 
for nanotechnology, these benefits are often associated with new risks.93 
A principal consideration when regulating nanotechnology will be 
balancing the benefits and risks.  
Nanotechnology has emerged in the United States during a tumultu-
ous political climate. The United States has recently faced a recession 
 
85. Id.  
86. Id.  
87. See Press Release, Wake Forest Baptist Med. Ctr, Nanotube Therapy 
Takes Aim at Breast Cancer Stem Cells (Feb. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.wakehealth.edu/News-Releases/2012/Nanotube_Therapy_ 
Takes_Aim_at_Breast_Cancer_Stem_Cells.htm. 
88. NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1. 
89. The ‘Power’ of Nanotechnology, NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW (July 13, 2007), 
http://www.nanotech-now.com/columns/?article=078. 
90. Id. 
91. Id.; Sandra Knisely, Carbon Nanotubes May Cheaply Harvest Sunlight, 
PHYSORG (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.physorg.com/news175182633.html. 
92. NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, supra note 1. 
93. See supra Part I. 
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from which it is still recovering.94 Because of the recession, the public has 
placed pressure on the President and other politicians to avoid heavy 
regulatory burdens on industrial manufacturers.95 Regulating nanotech-
nology too heavily may raise costs for consumers and inhibit 
technological advances, while failing to regulate at all could put public 
health at risk.  
One avenue for regulating environmental health and safety (EHS) 
risks associated with nanotechnology is the EPA’s Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA).96 TSCA is a “risk-benefit balancing statute” meant 
to balance the risks posed by a chemical or substance being regulated 
against the economic consequences of regulation.97 The EPA collects 
information through TSCA about new substances to be manufactured, 
and uses that information to decide when to intervene by limiting or 
banning production.98 TSCA requires the EPA to make findings with 
regard to the EHS of new products as well as the benefits of those 
products, the availability of alternatives, and the “reasonably ascertain-
able economic consequences” of regulating those products.99 TSCA also 
requires the EPA to regulate products as necessary to protect against 
potential risks, but only by imposing the least burdensome require-
ments.100 
A. The Toxic Substances Control Act 
TSCA is described as a “front-loaded” statute because it is meant to 
assess the environmental risks associated with a material before 
manufacturing and marketing occur.101 Through TSCA, the EPA 
 
94. See Chris Isidore, It’s Official: Recession Since Dec. ‘07, CNN MONEY, 
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(last updated Dec. 1, 2008, 5:40 PM EST). 
95. Bill Vlasic, U.S. Sets Higher Fuel Efficiency Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
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Obama EPA Rules Placed On Hold Until After the Election Spell Doom for 
Jobs and Economic Growth, CNS NEWS, http://cnsnews.com/sites/default/ 
files/ documents/A_Look_Ahead_to_ EPA_Regulations_for_2013.pdf; 
see Larry Bell, EPA’s Insanely Ambitious Agenda if Obama is Reelected, 
FORBES (Nov. 4, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/ 
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96. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, MANAGING THE EFFECTS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 10–12 
(2006), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/ 
2708/30_pen2_mngeffects.pdf [hereinafter DAVIES 3]. 
97. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 245–47 (6th ed. 2009).  
98. Id. at 247. 
99. Id.; Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2006).  
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
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regulates substances in three categories: (1) new substances that are not 
yet on the TSCA inventory, (2) substances that have already been 
assessed and placed on the TSCA inventory based on their current use, 
and (3) substances that are on the TSCA inventory but that are being 
used in a new way that may change the associated risks.102 One 
roadblock in regulating nanotechnology through TSCA is determining 
how to categorize nanotech products. Classifying a nanotech material as 
a new substance, a substance already on the TSCA inventory, or a new 
use for a TSCA inventory substance will affect how rigorously it is 
assessed before being approved for manufacturing.103 In many cases, 
manufacturers may be confused as to what they need to file with the 
EPA as they may be unsure of their product’s classification. 
1. The TSCA Process 
Under TSCA Section 8, the EPA keeps an inventory of all existing 
chemical substances that are manufactured or processed in the United 
States.104 TSCA Section 6 gives the EPA authority to prohibit or limit 
the manufacturing, processing or distribution of substances or mixtures 
containing substances that are on the TSCA inventory.105 “New chemical 
substances” are placed on the TSCA inventory through the pre-
manufacture notice process.106 Manufacturers are required to submit 
information to the EPA about new chemical substances at least ninety 
days before production begins.107 The required documentation includes 
basic chemical data as well as any available information regarding health 
risks.108 The EPA uses the pre-manufacture notice to determine whether 
manufacturing of the substance should be allowed without restrictions, 
allowed with some limitations, or banned altogether.109 A decision to 
limit or ban production will be based on whether there is a reasonable 
basis to conclude that the manufacturing of that substance poses an 
unreasonable risk to human health or the environment.110 Once a 
substance is placed on the TSCA inventory, all subsequent manufactur-
 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2006).  
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104. Id. 
105. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006). 
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108. Id. § 2604(b)(2)(B)(i). 
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ers who plan to use that substance in the same way are bound by the 
limitations set by the EPA.111 
The EPA also has the authority to restrict or ban the manufacturing 
of TSCA inventory substances that are being used in a way that is 
considered a “significant new use.”112 Using the same pre-manufacture 
notice process as it does for new chemical substances, the EPA requires 
documentation from the manufacturer explaining the chemical, the 
intended use of the chemical, and any known risks.113 If the EPA 
determines that the product is going to be put to a “significant new 
use,” it will set a significant new use rule (SNUR) for that substance.114 
The SNUR sets out any limitations the EPA deems necessary for the 
safe production of that substance for its new use. Anyone who intends to 
manufacture it for purposes of that significant new use will be bound by 
the SNUR promulgated by the EPA.115 
2. Limitations on TSCA Authority 
While the basic TSCA framework appears to give the EPA authority 
to decide which products should have limitations and which products 
should be banned, this authority is not without limits.116 As shown 
above, the EPA must balance the potential risks and benefits of a 
product while also considering the availability of substitutes and the 
economic consequences of regulating the product.117  
In 1989, the EPA issued a final rule under TSCA prohibiting the 
manufacture and use of asbestos.118 The EPA determined, after ten years 
of research and consideration, that asbestos presented an unreasonable 
risk to human health, and that the best way to reduce that risk was to 
ban production of asbestos.119 The asbestos industry quickly challenged 
this rule in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA.120 In Corrosion, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the EPA’s ban as being too 
burdensome for a product for which there were no substitutes presently 
available and because the cost of banning asbestos would be excessive 
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when compared to the number of lives that would be saved by the 
ban.121 The Corrosion Court’s holding shows that the EPA’s authority to 
limit or ban production of a material is not unlimited and that before 
the EPA can ban production of a material it must provide substantial 
evidence that the benefits of the regulation bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the costs of the regulation.122 
B. A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Applying TSCA to Nanotechnology 
The EPA may have authority to regulate nanotechnology through 
TSCA, but that does not mean that TSCA is an adequate method for 
protecting against EHS risks.123 Based on the processes and limitations of 
TSCA, the EPA will face several challenges in attempting to regulate 
nanotechnology.124 First, many nanomaterials are essentially smaller 
versions of existing materials. When this occurs, the EPA must decide 
whether to treat the nanoscale version the same as they treat the large-
scale version.125 The initial classification as new, existing, or a significant 
new use will have a significant impact on whether the product will be 
regulated at all.126  
Second, as discussed above, there is still uncertainty as to what risks 
are associated with nanotechnology.127 The TSCA process requires that 
manufacturers supply the EPA with material risk information before 
manufacturing begins, but TSCA does not require that the manufacturer 
actually perform an in-depth risk assessment.128 Instead, manufacturers 
are only required to submit the material and risk information that is 
available to them, and the EPA may require testing if it finds that a 
material may pose an unreasonable risk.129 There is no incentive for 
manufacturers to engage in voluntary, in-depth risk assessment because 
a lack of risk information is construed as a lack of risk.130 By providing 
minimal risk information, a manufacturer can be in compliance with 
TSCA while avoiding limitations on production that may have been 
imposed if further risk information had been provided.131 
 
121. Id. at 1229. 
122. Id. at 1220. 
123. See DAVIES 1, supra note 19, at 24. 
124. Id. at 22–23; Bergeson, supra note 101, at 6-7. 
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127. See supra Parts I.B–C. 
128. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2010). 
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Finally, once the EPA has weighed the risks and benefits of a nano-
tech substance, it must regulate using the least burdensome 
requirements.132 As we have seen with asbestos, determining the least 
burdensome requirements can be subjective, and if the EPA’s determina-
tion does not properly balance risks, benefits, and costs, then the 
regulation may be overturned if challenged.133 It is unclear whether 
TSCA intended the alternatives for limiting material production to be a 
hierarchy, so without further guidance, the EPA may not have a clear 
way of measuring whether one alternative is more burdensome than 
another.134  
1. Classification Confusion and Proposed Alternatives 
The EPA has already taken steps toward determining how it will 
classify nanomaterials for purposes of TSCA.135 Because many of those 
materials have a large-scale version already on the TSCA inventory, it is 
difficult to determine whether those nanoscale substances should be 
treated as new substances, substances already on the inventory, or 
significant new uses of substances already on the inventory.136 In 2008, 
the EPA released a document addressing the classification issue.137 In 
this paper, the EPA stated that its expectation was that while some 
nanoscale substances may qualify under TSCA as new chemical 
substances, not all of them will, and that the EPA would have to follow 
its historical approach of determining the “inventory status of chemical 
substances” on a “case-by-case” basis.138 
TSCA defines a “chemical substance” as “any organic or inorganic 
substance of a particular molecular identity . . . .”139 The EPA defines 
molecular identity as being “based on such structural and compositional 
features as the types and number of atoms in the molecule, the types 
and number of chemical bonds, the connectivity of atoms in the 
molecule, and the spatial arrangement of atoms within the molecule.”140 
When two substances have the same molecular identity, the EPA has 
declined to use particle size to distinguish the substances for purposes of 
 
132. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
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the TSCA inventory.141 When both a nanoscale version and a large-scale 
version of a substance exist, and both versions have matching molecular 
identities, placing either on the TSCA inventory “will encompass both . . 
. forms of the substance.”142 It follows that when a large-scale substance 
is already on the TSCA inventory, any new nanoscale versions of that 
substance will be considered an existing chemical.143  
An alternative to this would be to consider a nanoscale version of a 
large-scale substance to be a significant new use. If considered a 
significant new use, the nanoscale version of the substance would require 
a more rigorous assessment than an existing substance, similar to the 
assessment required for a new substance.144 This would not overcome the 
fact that new substance assessments may be insufficient, but it is an 
alternative to considering the nanoscale substances to be existing 
chemicals and to require no assessment at all. 
The EPA has begun the regulatory process for some types of carbon 
nanotubes.145 The EPA’s Inventory Status of Nanoscale Substances 
emphasizes the approach the EPA has always used in classifying 
substances under TSCA—focusing on the molecular identity of the 
substances.146 The EPA makes a general statement that “a molecule is 
the smallest unit of matter that retains all of its chemical properties.”147 
This definition illustrates that the EPA’s historical methods for 
determining whether a substance is a “new” or “existing” chemical 
cannot be so easily applied to nanotechnology, for one of the main traits 
of nanoscale substances is that they do not retain the chemical proper-
ties of their large-scale counterparts.148 The nanoscale version of a 
substance is no longer the same molecule because it now has different 
chemical properties than the large-scale version of the same substance 
and thus may present different risks than the large-scale version.149  
The EPA, however, does not consider the physical and chemical 
properties when defining a substance as “new” or “existing.”150 The EPA 
only considers molecular properties in determining whether two 
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substances are the same.151 The EPA should consider the fact that two 
substances may have the same molecular identity but different chemical 
and physical properties, and those properties should lead to a more 
stringent method for determining whether a nanoscale substance is the 
“same” as the large-scale version.  
The rationale behind more stringent testing for molecularly similar 
but physically and chemically different substances applies equally to 
evaluating locations on a simple road map. Two road maps from 
different places can appear the same: the roads can have very similar 
layouts and patterns making the two locations look identical. But if you 
actually visited those two locations, they may not be identical at all; one 
could be in a very hot climate with a flat surface, while the other could 
be a cold, snowy climate with a mountainous surface. Looking at a road 
map only gives you so much information about a location, and looking 
at the molecular identity of a substance will also only give you so much 
information about that substance. In either the chemical substance or 
road map scenario proposed above, increased granularity is required to 
perform a sufficient analysis. 
2. Lack of Risk Assessment and Uncertainty of Risks 
The legislative intent behind TSCA is to balance the risks posed by 
a product against the benefits and economic consequences of regulation, 
but it may be difficult to find balance when the risks posed by a product 
are unknown. It can be argued that the EPA has slowed the risk 
assessment process by not requiring manufacturer testing of nanoscale 
materials.152  
TSCA Section 5 gives the EPA authority to require testing of new 
chemicals or significant new uses of existing chemical substances when 
there is believed to be an unreasonable risk.153 This authority, however, 
does not mandate that the EPA must require testing, and it is no 
surprise that this power is used very conservatively due to limited 
resources and fear of political backlash.154 Imposing burdensome material 
testing requirements could be viewed as being insensitive to those 
affected by the weak economy and could hamper the development of 
beneficial nanoscale products. If material testing was required before 
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nanotech products could be manufactured, there would be less incentive 
for development of nanotech products, as the testing would be an added 
cost to the manufacturers.  
Manufacturers may also feel that there is an incentive not to gener-
ate risk assessment information.155 TSCA generally considers a lack of 
information about a substance as indicating a lack of risk associated 
with that substance.156 This gives manufacturers very little incentive to 
conduct in-depth risk assessment research, because there is no sanction 
for not undertaking that research and there may be penalties in the form 
of heavier regulation if they do provide data. 
3. Applying the Least-Burdensome Regulations 
The final issue in regulating nanotechnology through TSCA is the 
requirement that the EPA utilize the least burdensome alternative when 
applying regulations. Although TSCA gives the EPA comprehensive 
authority over any chemical substance or mixture, it has been noted that 
the “procedural and evidentiary demands of the statute sap it of much of 
its effectiveness.”157 That was evident in Corrosion, in which the Fifth 
Circuit demonstrated that what is “least burdensome” can be a very 
subjective determination.158 The EPA had conducted ten years of 
research compiled into a 45,000-page record before acting to ban 
asbestos. The EPA felt its finding supported a regulation banning 
asbestos, but the court found the EPA’s decision to be unduly burden-
some.159  
In Corrosion, the court found that by banning asbestos, the EPA 
had utilized the “most burdensome” of the possible alternatives for 
limiting production, stating that TSCA lists the seven alternatives in 
order of how burdensome they are.160 However, while a complete ban on 
a product can intuitively be labeled as “most burdensome,” the statute 
does not explicitly state that the alternatives are listed in a hierarchy 
from most burdensome to least.161 The Fifth Circuit determined that this 
is meant to be a hierarchy, but the statute allows that the alternatives 
can be used in combination, implying that no hierarchy was intended.162 
This inconsistency can make it very difficult for the EPA to utilize the 
least burdensome regulation, because other than banning production 
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entirely, it is not clear which alternatives will be considered more 
burdensome than others. 
Overall, regulating nanotechnology through TSCA will be difficult, 
at best. Some argue that TSCA is insufficient for regulating nanotech-
nology simply because it is a twentieth-century statute that was created 
at a time when nanotechnology was not even a consideration.163 
Classifying nanotech products through TSCA, balancing the risks and 
benefits, and applying the least burdensome regulations may create 
challenges for the EPA that will be difficult to overcome. 
III. Regulating Nanotechnology 
While the EPA and other regulatory agencies are under pressure to 
reduce EHS risks as human exposure to nanotechnology increases, there 
is also pressure to avoid over-regulating industries and companies that 
are creating new, useful technology and keeping the United States at the 
forefront of technological development. This is especially true at a time 
when the economy is unstable and regulatory burdens could be too 
costly for manufacturers to bear.  
What is needed most at this point is balance. While TSCA was 
enacted to achieve balance, for the reasons stated above, it may not be 
sufficient for managing modern technologies with widespread applica-
tions, like nanotechnology.164 The need for a more comprehensive 
nanotech oversight than TSCA can provide may be an opportunity to 
explore broader reform for the federal agencies that are already 
“suffer[ing] from under-funding and bureaucratic ossification” while 
trying to apply twentieth-century regulations to twenty-first-century 
technologies.165 Applying minor rule changes and increasing budgets to 
implementing current statutes are not adequate measures for dealing 
with new technologies.166 Instead, we should focus on new organizational 
forms within federal agencies.167 
There have been many suggestions for new laws and new organiza-
tional forms for regulating nanotechnology. In this Section, I will explore 
three of those possibilities. One suggestion is to avoid federal regulations 
entirely and allow the nanotech industry to self-regulate.168 Self-
regulation of nanotechnology would utilize the knowledge and experience 
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of experts within the industry, who would be responsible for creating a 
set of guidelines or a code of conduct for industry participants to adhere 
to.169 Another recommendation is to create a new federal agency that 
would manage the EHS risks associated with chemicals or substances as 
well as the risks associated with products.170 This recommendation would 
apply to nanotechnology as well as other modern technologies.171 A third 
option would be to combine the efficiency of self-regulation with the 
oversight of a federal agency to create a form of co-regulation for 
addressing nanotechnology risks.172 This could be accomplished by 
expanding key agencies to include “Nanotech Divisions” that would 
employ various processes to ensure a balanced approach to risk 
assessment and management.173  
A. Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation is not meant to exempt industry from complying with 
federal laws and regulations. It is meant to allow nongovernmental 
entities to independently create their own rules, codes of conduct and 
enforcement measures to implement existing government rules and 
regulations.174 Self-regulation can occur at an individual level, where an 
entity would regulate itself, or a group level, where an industry or 
association would set rules and standards to be followed by all entities 
within that industry or association.175  
The idea that governments should not monopolize regulation has 
been explored through discussions of decentering regulation.176 The 
concept of decentering regulation posits that industries, organizations, 
and associations can and should have the power to regulate internally 
and that the role of government regulation should be limited as much as 
possible.177 This suggests that there should be a shift away from total 
government regulation by allowing self-regulation because this would 
allow for greater flexibility in product development and less regulatory 
burden on smaller developers and manufacturers of certain products.178    
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There are several potential benefits to self-regulation. It makes sense 
to allow industry practitioners and experts to be involved in the 
regulation process. Those experts can make decisions efficiently without 
the constraints of federal agency decision-making processes.179 Self-
regulation would also allow industries to bypass the legislative process in 
developing rules and procedures to ensure compliance with existing 
government regulations.  
When an industry or association is self-regulated by those who are 
familiar with the intricacies of the industry, there is a higher level of 
expertise not often found among legislators.180 Because self-regulation has 
flexibility, efficiency, and expertise, it promotes a regulatory atmosphere 
where a manufacturer will feel it is being governed by a code that 
applies to it directly—one that will conform to the manufacturers’ 
changing needs, rather than a broad, general standard to which 
manufacturer must conform.181 
B. Federal Agency Regulation 
As discussed above, current federal statutes like TSCA are a poor fit 
for nanotechnology.182 It is difficult to determine whether a nanoscale 
version of a material would be considered a “new” or “existing” material 
when the large-scale version is already on the TSCA inventory.183 We 
have already seen that a nanoscale version of a substance can be 
significantly different from the large-scale version, but through TSCA, 
these markedly different substances will be treated as if they are the 
same.184 It is also difficult to balance the risks and benefits of nanotech-
nology through TSCA, as nanotechnology is a widespread field with 
many applications. With these difficulties, the EPA may struggle to 
determine the least burdensome way to regulate nanotechnology.185 
Overall, TSCA creates a disincentive for manufacturers to generate or 
provide risk information for their chemicals and products because it is 
assumed that if there is no risk information, there is no risk.186 
One commentator, J.C. Davies, has suggested that TSCA is simply 
too outdated and too weak for regulating nanotechnology and that 
merely making adjustments within TSCA will not fix these deficien-
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cies.187 Davies is a senior project advisor to the Project on Emerging 
Nanotechnologies and one of the co-authors of the plan that created the 
EPA in the 1970’s.188 Davies recommends addressing nanotechnology by 
creating a new federal agency—the Department of Environmental and 
Consumer Protection (DECP).189 The DECP would be tasked with more 
than just regulating nanotechnology and would be useful in addressing 
the challenges posed by twenty-first-century technological advances in 
general.190  
This plan would work to address many issues that arise as we try to 
regulate modern technology through the existing agencies and regula-
tions created to protect public health. The idea of integrating and 
restructuring the existing agencies to create an entirely new administra-
tive framework is daunting, but we are at a time in technological 
development where it will become increasingly difficult to fix the 
shortcomings of the current regulatory scheme.191 
Even if the proposed DECP seems extreme during this time of eco-
nomic strain, its merits are worth exploring. Davies’ proposal addresses 
many of the weaknesses in trying to apply the current environmental 
regulatory system to modern technology. For effective oversight, Davies 
argues that new concepts, types of organizations, and tools will be 
necessary.192 The large-scale environmental problems created by 
nanotechnology (and other modern technologies) are not compatible 
with the current “fragmented system” of oversight.193 This fragmented 
system is made up of legislation including the Clean Air Act, the Clean 
Water Act, and various waste disposal programs. Each program works 
individually, which is an inefficient way to manage areas of environmen-
tal concern because the seemingly different areas of the environment are 
all in reality interconnected.194 In many cases, and especially when it 
comes to nanotechnology, regulating the risks associated with different 
products would benefit from combined risk research and monitoring.195  
Creating the DECP would provide much-needed flexibility to the 
organizations responsible for regulating nanotechnology.196 It would not 
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eliminate and replace but would incorporate existing agencies.197 The 
agencies to be incorporated would include: (1) the EPA; (2) the US 
Geological Survey; (3) the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration; (4) the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; (5) 
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health; and (6) the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission.198 Through oversight, research, 
and monitoring, the proposed agency could also be used to address other 
complicated environmental issues, like climate change.199 Incorporating 
the six agencies into the DECP would allow for a greater influence on 
policy and sufficient resources to address the new and ever-changing 
issues that accompany modern technology.200 
C. Co-Regulation201 
The benefits of self-regulation are appealing in a new, specialized 
field like nanotechnology because it allows those who are most familiar 
with the intricacies of the field to develop rules in a flexible and efficient 
manner. But even with these benefits, self-regulation is not the best 
route for managing the EHS risks of nanotechnology. There has been a 
certain level of discomfort expressed by the public and activist groups, 
who tend to believe that allowing industries and companies to self-
regulate is akin to allowing those entities to not be regulated at all, and 
that self-regulation of nanotechnology will not sufficiently protect public 
health or the environment.202 Additionally, the idea of self-regulation 
does not quite fit because nanotechnology is not an industry, but rather 
a technology that has infiltrated a variety of industries.203 Self-regulation 
is propelled by the idea of an industry banding together with a common 
goal to promote product stewardship, but coordinating all of the 
nanotech industries would prove to be more difficult and there would be 
too many variances in values and industry norms for self-regulation to be 
effective.  
Self-regulation has been put to use in the past through the chemical 
industry’s Responsible Care Program (RCP).204 Created in Canada in 
1985, the RCP was adopted in the United States in 1989 to help increase 
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the public’s confidence in chemical companies, and it is now part of a 
global initiative to improve environmental and health performance 
within the chemical industry.205 The main focus of the RCP is to 
enhance product stewardship by improving risk communication through 
the supply chain.206 More than fifty national chemical management 
associations participate in the program, which is managed globally by 
the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA).207 National 
chemical associations commit to the program through an application 
process administered by the ICCA.208 Once a national chemical associa-
tion is part of the program, chemical companies within that nation may 
voluntarily enroll in the RCP, which is then implemented by the 
national chemical association in accordance with the goals and mission of 
the ICCA.209 
There has been some debate over whether self-regulation is a suffi-
cient means to achieve environmental and public health goals in the 
absence of heavy government regulation.210 Some argue that without 
explicit sanctions in place to prevent opportunistic behavior, self-
regulation will not succeed.211 Others argue that explicit sanctions are 
not necessary for successful self-regulation because industry behavior will 
be controlled “through informal means of coercion, the transferal of 
norms, and the diffusion of best practices.”212 The RCP is an example of 
self-regulation that is not implemented through explicit sanctions.213  
Another argument against self-regulation is that it seems to serve 
the industry being regulated instead of the public interest.214 This has 
been viewed as “an attempt to deceive the public into believing in the 
responsibility of a[n] irresponsible industry” or “a strategy to give the 
government an excuse for not doing its job.”215 In 2005, two non-
governmental entities, DuPont Chemical Company and Environmental 
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Defense, joined together to create the Nano Risk Framework, a 
voluntary risk assessment framework for nanotechnology.216 This attempt 
at jump-starting self-regulation was rejected by several activist groups 
who claimed that “[t]he history of other voluntary regulation proposals is 
bleak; voluntary regulations have often been used to delay or weaken 
rigorous regulation and should be seen as a tactic to delay needed 
regulation and forestall public involvement.”217 
Self-regulation may also be burdensome on the nanotech industry 
financially. Some would argue that self-regulation places minimal 
financial burden on industry, but without government oversight there 
will be no government funding to support the necessary research and risk 
assessments or the implementation and auditing of the rules that result 
from those assessments. This could place an especially heavy burden on 
the smaller sectors of the nanotech industry that may not have the 
resources to perform testing. 
Federal agency regulation of nanotechnology has proven to be a 
complicated matter up to this point. Initial attempts to regulate 
nanotechnology through TSCA have been sloppy and difficult,218 and 
past attempts by the EPA to regulate other potentially unsafe materials 
through TSCA have been rejected, even with large amounts of research 
supporting the EPA’s position.219 
Davies’ idea of integrating federal agencies to create the DECP is 
intriguing, but may not be feasible. It is important not to hinder 
industry and new technology development with heavy regulatory 
burdens during a turbulent political climate and a struggling economy. 
Creating a new agency would be a large regulatory undertaking, and this 
could be viewed as a step towards heavier regulatory burdens on 
industry at a time when industry is already burdened by many other 
financial difficulties. 
When it comes to nanotechnology, the number of industry experts is 
increasing every day, but the federal agencies are failing to keep up with 
the expanding field. With the current statutes in place, the EPA is not 
equipped to assess and manage the EHS risks of nanotechnology. Trying 
to regulate nanotechnology through TSCA is like trying to fit a square 
peg into a round hole—it just won’t work.220  
Co-regulation through the creation of new, interconnected divisions 
within key agencies will overcome the weaknesses of self-regulation and 
the difficulties of government regulation through TSCA or the creation 
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of the DECP. This co-regulation program would incorporate the 
expertise and flexibility of self-regulation with the oversight of a federal 
agency. I am proposing that each federal agency that will address 
nanotechnology be expanded to include a “Nanotech Division” (ND).  
The NDs would work through a five-step process. First, the NDs will 
be created to employ industry and agency nanotech experts. Second, the 
NDs would begin gathering information from nanotech industry 
participants through a mandatory program. Third, the NDs would 
conduct thorough quantitative risk assessments based on the information 
gathered from industry participants. Fourth, the NDs would establish 
guidance documents or recommend regulations where necessary to 
address EHS risks. Finally, the NDs will be expanded or minimized as 
deemed necessary by the outcomes of the continuing risk research.  
The final intensity of governmental regulatory authority over a 
nanotech product or nanosubstance will be dependent on the outcome of 
the risk assessments, with heavier government authority for a higher 
level of proven risk and lighter government authority for a lower level of 
proven risk. The complexity of heavier government authority will be 
justified if there is a high level of proven risk. Inversely, a low level of 
proven risk will show little need for government oversight and lighter 
government authority will be appropriate. 
1. Step One: Creating Nanotech Divisions 
The agencies that would expand or reorganize to include NDs would 
be the same agencies that Davies recommends for incorporation into the 
DECP: (1) the EPA; (2) the US Geological Survey; (3) the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; (4) the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration; (5) the National Institute of Occupational 
Safety and Health; and (6) the Consumer Products Safety Commis-
sion.221 Throughout the five-step process, each ND would work with its 
parent agency to address the specific concerns of that agency and would 
also work cooperatively with other NDs as many of the potential risks 
and applicable assessments will overlap.  
One initial concern will be the lack of government employees who 
are nanotech experts. In general, nanotechnology experts will earn more 
money working in the private sector than they would as a government 
employee. Budgeting is always an issue, and there simply may not be 
resources to pay more to employ experts within the existing agencies. 
This is one of the main justifications for utilizing co-regulation—
government employees are not expected to have this type of expertise 
when it comes to nanotechnology. Instead of hiring nanotechnology 
experts as agency employees, each agency could set aside a portion of its 
budget to use towards working with industry experts on a contract basis, 
either to provide the agency with information as needed or to give the 
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agency’s ND employees training to help build their expertise in 
nanotechnology. 
2. Step Two: Manufacturer Information Production 
Once the NDs are created, they will begin gathering material infor-
mation. The information-gathering process would follow the structure of 
a program implemented several years ago, but with some key changes. In 
2005, the EPA National Pollution Prevention and Toxics Advisory 
Committee (NPPTAC) set forth a framework for a Nanoscale Materials 
Voluntary Program, which would later be called the Nanoscale Materials 
Stewardship Program (NMSP).222 This framework included suggestions 
for a “basic” program and an “in-depth” program.223 The basic program 
applies to Step Two of my recommendation, while the in-depth program 
would apply to Step Three. The basic program involved three activities 
for each nanoscale material: 
1) Reporting existing . . . material characterization information on 
the material in commerce and materials soon to enter commerce, 
as well as existing information characterizing hazard, use and  
exposure potential, and risk management practices; 2) Filling in 
gaps in basic information about material characteristics ONLY; 
and 3) Implementing basic risk management practices.224 
The EPA created the basic program in hopes of having a broad range of 
organizations participate in providing relevant information on material 
characterization, hazard information, use and exposure potential, and 
risk management practices.225 As part of the program, the organizations 
would also agree to implement environmental and occupational safety 
controls such as hazard communication, worker training, and waste 
management practices.226  
The basic flaw of the NMSP was that the voluntariness of the  
program invited low levels of participation. Between the start of the 
NMSP and the final information submission date on July 28, 2008, 
sixteen companies and trade associations voluntarily submitted 
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information on ninety-one nanoscale materials for the basic program.227 
The information gathered through the basic program included very basic 
chemical and manufacturing information, but very few submissions 
actually included toxicity information as the submitters considered this 
information to be confidential business information.228 The EPA stated 
that “approximately 90% of the different nanoscale materials that are 
likely to be commercially available were not reported under the Basic 
Program,”229 so the information gathered during the basic program 
represents a small fraction of nanotechnology. 
A way to overcome this flaw as the NDs make another attempt to 
gather information from manufacturers would be to utilize different 
methods to encourage participation. One method could be requiring 
mandatory participation. Participation could be required without placing 
a heavy burden on manufacturers because Step Two of the program 
would simply be gathering the information manufacturers already have 
on hand, even if this information is minimal. The information gathered 
would be protected as confidential business information and would be 
used generally to assess EHS risks. Manufacturers that fail to participate 
in a mandatory disclosure of information could be fined to help fund the 
other ND program steps. 
If mandatory participation would be considered too burdensome, the 
ND could still encourage voluntary participation using economic tools. 
For example, if a manufacturer willingly provides product information 
for this step, that manufacturer would benefit from not having to test 
those materials because the ND would perform testing during Step Three 
risk assessment. Manufacturers that do not willingly provide their basic 
product information during Step Two could be required to perform the 
risk assessments from Step Three at their own expense. 
3. Step Three: Quantitative Risk Assessments 
Step Three would involve quantitative risk assessments similar to 
those from the in-depth program of the NMSP. The in-depth program 
was designed to go beyond the basic program by taking the information 
provided through the basic program and generating new, in-depth 
information about the nanotech materials.230 The in-depth information 
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would be obtained through monitoring workplaces, environmental 
releases and worker health, and quantitative risk assessments.231  
For a more thorough assessment than was provided by the NMSP, 
the NDs quantitative risk assessments would be accomplished through 
the US government’s National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). The 
NNI was launched as a collaborative agency effort in 2001.232 The goals 
of the NNI are (1) “[t]o advance world-class nanotechnology research 
and development”; (2) “[t]o foster the transfer of new technologies into 
products for commercial and public benefit”; (3) “[t]o develop and 
sustain educational resources, a skilled workforce and the supporting 
infrastructure and tools to advance nanotechnology”; and (4) “[t]o 
support the responsible development of nanotechnology.”233 While 
researching EHS risks associated with nanotechnology is an essential 
step towards achieving each of these goals, it is most closely related to 
the goal of “responsible development.”234  
The NNI was created to allow all of the agencies that may be  
involved with nanotechnology to work together with the nanotech 
industry to conduct research in the field, but the NNI is a general research 
initiative that focuses more on development of nanotech products than 
researching nanotech risks. There is some federal funding for NNI through 
the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003 
(NRD Act),235 but only 3 to 4 percent of federal NNI funding is used 
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towards risk assessment research.236 Additional risk assessment funding 
comes from the federal agencies themselves.237 
The risk assessment process outlined by the NNI follows a basic 
scientific procedure that includes identifying hazards, assessing magni-
tude of exposure, assessing dose-response relationships, and 
characterizing risks.238 This process is generally accepted within the 
scientific and regulatory communities because it creates perspective 
between toxicity, hazards, and risks associated with a material.239  
4. Step Four: Developing Guidance and Regulations 
Step Four of my recommendation is for the NDs to use the gathered 
risk information to develop industry guidance documents or to recom-
mend new regulations as necessary. This is a step that will occur at 
regular intervals simultaneously with the other steps. The information 
gathered in Step Two and the research conducted in Step Three will give 
some indication as to the EHS risks presented by nanotechnology. 
Minimal or uncertain risks can be addressed through guidance docu-
ments, while serious risks can be addressed through regulations.  
Industry guidance for nanotechnology has been difficult to establish. 
One reason for this is the fact that there is still so much uncertainty as 
to the EHS risks of nanotechnology. Because the risks are uncertain, it is 
difficult to guide industry on avoiding those risks, but there should still 
be some form of guidance, even if minimal at first, to assist manufactur-
ers of nanoproducts in making decisions about how to handle those 
products. For example, the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health has created a guidance document called Approaches to Safe 
Nanotechnology to assist manufacturers in implementing occupational 
safety measures to help reduce worker exposure to nanoparticles.240 The 
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occupational health and safety risks associated with nanotechnology are 
also uncertain at this time, but this guidance was created to address the 
potential concerns as a safeguard while thorough risk assessments are 
being performed.241 Similar guidance could be created to address the 
potential risks. 
The NNI Environmental, Health, and Safety Research Strategy was 
developed as guidance for agencies associated with nanomaterials to 
assist those agencies in understanding their responsibilities, to identify 
opportunities for agency collaboration, and to assist the NNI in 
achieving federal goals for nanotech health and safety.242 This could be a 
good starting point for creating industry guidance through the NDs. 
Regulations can be used to address significant risks. It is difficult to 
predict how the regulation process will occur because it is currently 
uncertain whether there are significant risks and what those risks may 
be. Once the risks are certain, each federal agency can determine 
whether those risks can be addressed through current regulations or 
whether new regulations need to be enacted. Creating new regulations is 
not a simple process, and that is why this option would be reserved for 
addressing known substantial risks discovered after the thorough risk 
assessment process of Step Four. Should this be necessary, the co-
regulation would lean a bit more heavily towards government regulation. 
5. Step Five: Adjusting Nanotech Divisions to Address Actual Risks 
Step Five cannot be outlined in detail until the EHS risk research 
outcomes are determined. The purpose of this five-step process is to 
allow the regulation of nanotechnology to conform to the level of certain 
risk. The NDs will be created to address unknown risks and to promote 
researching those potential risks. As the research continues, there may 
be several potential outcomes. Nanotechnology may not present any 
EHS risks and may be deemed categorically safe. On the other hand, 
nanotechnology may be found to present a wide variety of serious risks 
and may be deemed categorically unsafe. A third (and likely) outcome 
falls between these two extremes—there may be some products and uses 
for nanotechnology that pose severe EHS risks while other products and 
uses pose no risks at all.243 Whichever of these three outcomes occurs will 
determine whether the final regulatory structure will lean more towards 
self-regulation, government regulation, or a balanced co-regulation. 
If nanotechnology is found to be categorically safe, the NDs can be 
reduced to smaller groups that can be used to continue testing and 
analyzing new products as they are created. The smaller NDs will have 
experience in analyzing the safety of nanotech products at that point 
and should be able to continue monitoring new products in an efficient 
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yet thorough manner to ensure that the continued manipulation of 
nanoparticles does not create EHS risks in the future. 
If nanotechnology is found to be categorically unsafe, the NDs may 
be used to create and enforce new federal regulations. The complex and 
lengthy process of creating new regulations would be appropriate at that 
point because there would be a need to protect the environment and the 
public from the proven risks associated with nanotechnology. The need 
for heavier government regulations may motivate certain manufacturers 
to abandon the risky nanotech products and either go back to using 
other existing products or develop a new, safer alternative to nanotech-
nology. 
The most likely outcome from Steps One through Four is that nano-
technology will include a combination of products that create a very low 
level of risk, products that create a high level of risk, and some products 
that fall in between. Nanotechnology involves the manipulation of nature 
to such a degree that it is a logical assumption that there will be some 
risks. With this mixed outcome, the NDs can be adjusted within each 
agency to account for different regulatory needs.  
For example, there may be a higher level of risk for employees who 
work directly with nanoparticles on a daily basis. These employees may 
have a higher likelihood of exposure to free nanoparticles in the air and 
on surfaces around them. The Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration could expand the role of its ND as necessary to account for the 
higher level of risk associated with worker exposure. At the same time, 
the EPA may find that there is actually very little risk associated with 
disposal of products that contain fixed nanoparticles—like sheets of 
metal with nanoscale components. With little risk at the time of 
disposal, the EPA’s ND could minimize its focus on waste products 
containing nanoparticles and expand its efforts towards other areas 
where the level of risk is higher. This flexibility would allow each 
agency’s ND to focus on the areas of higher risk with greater regulation 
and oversight. The nanotech industry would benefit by not having to 
face the burden of complying with regulations imposed on products that 
pose no risk, and the federal agencies would benefit by being able to 
focus efforts solely on areas of concern. 
Overall, the Nanotech Divisions I am recommending will address 
some of the concerns presented by other nanotech programs by creating 
a flexible Five-Step program that can be adjusted based on the outcomes 
of ongoing EHS risk assessments. The program will be strict because it 
will include mandatory components requiring contributions from 
industry and mandatory guidance or regulations where necessary, but it 
will also be flexible by avoiding excessive regulation of unknown risks. 
This program will combine elements of self-regulation with a new federal 
agency structure that is able to address modern technologies. 
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Conclusion 
Any program used to regulate nanotechnology must balance its bene-
fits and uncertain risks. The EPA has addressed new technologies and 
unknown risks in the past but may not be equipped to address the 
uncertainties posed by nanotechnology. Through a program that addresses 
the gaps in current TSCA regulation and allows for utilization of industry 
expertise, proper risk assessments can be conducted to ensure that 
technological advances presented by nanotechnology are both beneficial 
and safe. My recommendation for co-regulation through the creation of a 
Nanotech Division within the EPA and other agencies addresses the 
weaknesses associated with trying to regulate nanotechnology through 
TSCA by incorporating components from existing programs, with some 
adjustments, to create a more comprehensive program that is well-suited 
for regulating nanotechnology. This co-regulation will address the current 
unknown EHS risks of nanotechnology and will prepare the EPA and 
other agencies for long-term regulation of nanotechnology once the EHS 
risks have been established. 
